Henry Simons, one of the early pillars of the Chicago School of Economics and a student of Frank Knight’s, emphasised monetary rules as opposed to monetary discretion. Milton Friedman, a more recent Chicago School economist, argued that the Fed would do a better job of managing monetary policy if it were required to increase the money supply by some defined percentage, say 3% per year. Both of these gentlemen feared the power of a central bank being able to act in discretionary fashion.
Friedman expressed the problem thusly:
The power to determine the quantity of money… is too important, too pervasive, to be exercised by a few people, however public-spirited, if there is any feasible alternative. There is no need for such arbitrary power… Any system which gives so much power and so much discretion to a few men, [so] that mistakes – excusable or not – can have such far reaching effects, is a bad system. It is a bad system to believers in freedom just because it gives a few men such power without any effective check by the body politic – this is the key political argument against an independent central bank.
Doug Noland writes about this problem in the context of our times (emboldening mine):
Henry Simons Was Right:
“The establishment of definite, stable, legislative rules of the game as to money, or in other words, the creation of a national monetary system, are of paramount importance to the survival of a system based on freedom of enterprise.” Henry Simons, 1936
Listening to Chairman Bernanke’s Wednesday press conference, I was reminded of the long-standing but forgotten “rules vs. discretion” debate with respect to monetary policy. Dr. Bernanke is
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